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I. INTRODUCTION
THE WARSAW CONVENTION1 was established as an agree-
ment between countries to set liability limits for death or in-
jury caused during international air travel. The original goals of
the Warsaw Convention were to provide uniform liability limits
and to develop uniform procedures for dealing with interna-
tional air transportation claims for death or personal injury
caused by air travel accidents.2 The drafting history of the War-
Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to International
Transportation by Air, Oct. 12, 1929, 49 Stat. 3000, 137 L.N.T.S. 11, reprinted at49
U.S.C. app. § 1502 note 1 (1994) [hereinafter Warsaw Convention].
2 Andreas F. Lowenfeld & Allan I. Mendelsohn, The United States and the Warsaw
Convention, 80 HARv. L. REV. 497, 498-99 (1967); see, e.g., Boehringer-Mannheim
Diagnostics, Inc. v. Pan American World Airways, Inc., 737 F.2d 456, 458 (5th Cir.
1984) (stating that the Warsaw Convention's goal was to establish uniform law for
airline accidents), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1186 (1985); Reed v. Wiser, 555 F.2d 1079,
1089 (2d Cir.) (stating that the Warsaw Convention's objective was to limit airline
liability), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 922 (1977); Velasquez v. Aerovias Nacionales de
Colom., S.A., 747 F. Supp. 670, 673, 675-76 (S.D. Fla. 1990) (stating that the
Warsaw Convention's objective was to establish uniformity for airline liability);
Husserl v. Swiss Air Transp. Co., 388 F. Supp. 1238, 1244 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (stating
that the Warsaw Convention's main goal was to protect airlines from destructive
liability in the event of an airline crash); see also Block v. Compagnie Nationale
Air Fr., 386 F.2d 323, 327 (5th Cir. 1967) (stating that the Warsaw Convention's
goals were to provide uniform rules for documents limiting carrier liability for
airplane accidents), cert. denied, 392 U.S. 905 (1968); David I. Sheinfeld, Com-
ment, From Warsaw to Tenerife: A Chronological Analysis of the Liability Limitations
Imposed Pursuant to the Warsaw Convention, 45 J. AIR L. & COM. 653, 656 (1980)
(examining inequities of passenger recovery under the Warsaw Convention).
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saw Convention clearly demonstrates that the Convention's pri-
mary goal was to provide industry-wide uniform liability for
death or personal injury caused by an airline accident. 3 Uni-
form limited liability was needed to "foster the growth of the
fledgling commercial aviation industry."4 The Warsaw Conven-
tion's uniform limitation on liability applied to all international
flights and was intended to "attract capital that might otherwise
be scared away by the fear of a single catastrophic accident."5
The unification of procedures was intended to decrease and
simplify litigation.6
The airline industry has changed dramatically in the sixty
years since the signing of the Warsaw Convention. Air carriers
are now sufficiently financed, and liability insurance is readily
available. 7 The airline industry can bear the burden of loss in
major, catastrophic accidents as it is "capable of reimbursing
customers for the damages it causes them."'
Because of the United States' dissatisfaction with the liability
limits, international airlines serving the United States entered
into an unofficial agreement that increased strict liability limits
to U.S. $75,000 when the United States is the place of departure
or destination, or an agreed stopping place of the international
flight.9 Depending on the destination, departure, or agreed
stopping place of an international flight, and whether the coun-
try of destination, departure, or stopping place is a signatory of
the Warsaw Convention, Hague Protocol, or Montreal Agree-
ment, passengers on the same flight may be subject to different
liability limits.10 Stated simply, the uniformity goal of the War-
saw Convention has not been met.' In light of the lack of uni-
formity and the embarrassingly low liability limits under the
s Eastern Airlines, Inc. v. Floyd, 499 U.S. 530, 546 (1991).
4 Id.
5 Lowenfeld & Mendelsohn, supra note 2, at 499.
6 Id. (citing SENATE COMM. ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, MESSAGE FROM THE PREsI-
DENT OF THE UNITED STATES TRANSMITTING A CONVENTION FOR THE UNIFICATION
OF CERTAIN RULES, SEN. EXEC. Doc. No. G, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 3-4 (1934)).
7 BARRY E. CARTER & PHILLIP R. TRIMBLE, INTERNATIONAL LAw 1077 (1991).
8 Ray B. Jeffirey, Comment, The Growth of American Judicial Hostility Towards the
Liability Limitations of the Warsaw Convention, 48J. AIR L. & COM. 805, 830 (1983).
9 Order of Civil Aeronautics'Board Approving Increases in liability Limita-
tions of Warsaw Convention and Hague Protocol, Agreement CAB 18900, adopted
on May 13, 1966, reprinted in 49 U.S.C. app. § 1502 (1982). This agreement is a
private agreement not rising to the force of law of a treaty.
10 Kimberlee S. Cagle, The Role of Choice of Law in Determining Damages for Inter-
national Aviation Accidents, 51J. AIR L. & CoM. 953, 961-66 (1986).
11 Id. at 966.
1995-1996] 439
JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AMD COMMERCE
Warsaw Convention and its amendments, ten Japanese airlines
have contracted out of international flight liability limits gov-
erned under the Warsaw Convention. 12
This Comment discusses the background of the Warsaw Con-
vention and its amendments, the circumstances leading up to
the Japanese abandonment of Warsaw Convention liability lim-
its, and the effect of the Japanese action on other international
airlines, especially those based in the United States.
II. THE WARSAW CONVENTION AND ITS AFTERMATH
A. UNIFORMITY ACHIEVED VIA LIBILITY CAPS
The Warsaw Convention is an international treaty entered
into by 128 countries in 1929.13 The Convention's original
goals, setting uniform liability limits for death or personal injury
in international airline accidents and setting uniform proce-
dures for dealing with international air transportation claims,
were accomplished by a trade-off between the proof of liability
and the limit set by the convention for plaintiffs' losses. 4 To
provide uniform liability limits, the Warsaw Convention shifted
the burden of proof in international accidents to the air car-
rier.15 The air carrier is presumed to be liable unless it can
prove otherwise.
The recovery of a plaintiff is limited under the Warsaw Con-
vention to the liability limits that were established in 1929 and
amended later by the Hague Protocol and the Montreal Proto-
col.1 6 As stated by article 25 of the Warsaw Convention, a plain-
tiff must prove that the air carrier acted with willful misconduct
12 Robert Rice, Japanese Airlines to Scrap Limit on Liability for Victims, FIN. TIMES,
Nov. 19, 1992, at 1.
13 Warsaw Convention, supra note 1.
14 See id. at arts. 17, 21.
15 Id. The full text of article 17 states:
The carrier shall be liable for damage sustained in the event of the
death or wounding of a passenger or any other bodily injury suf-
fered by a passenger, if the accident which caused the damage so
sustained took place on board the aircraft or in the course of any of
the operations of embarking or disembarking.
Id. at art. 17.
16 SeeWarsaw Convention, supra note 1, at art. 22; Protocol to Amend the Con-
vention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to International Carriage by
Air Signed at Warsaw, Oct. 12, 1929, 478 U.N.T.S. 371 (1963) [hereinafter Hague
Protocol]; Agreement Relating to Liability Limitations of the Warsaw Convention
and the Hague Protocol, Agreement CAB 18900, adopted on May 13, 1966, re-
printed in 31 Fed. Reg. 7302 (1966) [hereinafter Montreal Protocol].
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to obtain an award higher than the agreed-upon liability limits.17
The consequence of article 25 has been a considerable amount
of litigation attempting to prove willful misconduct on the part
of air carriers in order to circumvent the liability limits estab-
lished by the Warsaw Convention.18
B. DISSATISFACTION WITH "INADEQUATE" LIABILITY LIMITS
LEADS TO MODIFICATION OF THE WARSAW CONVENTION
The original liability limit established by the Warsaw Conven-
tion was approximately U.S. $8300.19 The Convention based
this amount on the "poincare franc" which fluctuated with the
gold standard and did not adjust for inflation.20 As time passed,
the Warsaw Convention's liability limit became woefully inade-
quate to compensate injured passengers because of the rising
cost of inflation.21 It became apparent that the Warsaw Conven-
tion was not meeting its goals.22
The United States, in particular, became concerned about the
inadequacies of the Warsaw Convention's liability limits. In the
United States the amounts of recovery in domestic flight per-
sonal injury and death actions far exceeded the limits estab-
lished by the Warsaw Convention.23 At the International Civil
17 Warsaw Convention, supra note 1, at art. 25(1). Article 25(1) states:
The carrier shall not be entitled to avail himself of the provisions of this
convention which exclude or limit his liability, if the damage is
caused by his wilful misconduct or by such default on his part as, in
accordance with the law of the court to which the case is submitted,
is considered to be equivalent to wilful misconduct.
Id. (emphasis added).
18 See generally Floyd v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 872 F.2d 1462 (11th Cir. 1989)
(six-year litigation to prove mechanical failure constituted willful misconduct),
rev'd, 499 U.S. 530 (1991); Abramson v.Japan.Airlines Co., 739 F.2d 130 (3d Cir.
1984) (two-;,ear litigation attempting to prove that negligent conduct by the air-
line aggravating a passenger's pre-existing medical condition constituted willful
misconduct), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1059 (1985); In re Korean Air Lines Disaster of
Sept. 1, 1983, 807 F. Supp. 1073 (S.D.N.Y. 1992) (nine-year litigation to prove
that the destruction of Flight KE007 by Soviet military aircraft was caused by will-
ful misconduct); In re Inflight Explosion on TWA, 778 F. Supp. 625 (E.D.N.Y.
1991) (five-year litigation to prove the airline's negligence in safety precautions
constituted willful misconduct according to the Warsaw Convention), rev'd sub
nom. Ospina v. Trans World Airlines, 975 F.2d 35 (2d Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113
S. Ct. 1944 (1993).
19 Lowenfeld & Mendelsohn, supra note 2, at 499.
20 Id.
21 Sheinfeld, supra note 2, at 656.
22 Id. at 658-59.
23 Lowenfeld & Mendelsohn, supra note 1, at 504.
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Aviation Organization (ICAO) International Conference on Pri-
vate Air Law in September 1955, delegates discussed several rea-
sons for abandoning or amending the Warsaw Convention's
liability limits.2 4 First, the improved safety record of the airline
industry would enable the air carriers to purchase liability insur-
ance at cheaper rates than originally calculated. Second, the
improved safety record and the increased experience of air car-
riers made the protections provided, by the Warsaw Convention
too extensive. 6 With fewer airline crashes than anticipated, and
with less expensive liability insurance readily available to air car-
riers, financial risk decreased for the airline industry, which re-
duced the need for protection by the Warsaw Convention's
liability limit. In view of this decreased risk, airlines no longer
needed the protection of strict liability coupled with a liability
cap. Hence, there was industry-wide dissatisfaction with the
Warsaw Convention. The need for modification to the Warsaw
Convention's liability limit led to the Hague Conference. 7
C. THE HAGUE CONFERENCE LEADS TO U.S. DENUNCIATION OF
THE WARSAW CONVENTION
The conference at the Hague in the Netherlands culminated
in an amendment to the Warsaw Convention. After much delib-
eration the liability limit was increased from approximately U.S.
$8300 to U.S. $16,600.8 Although this increase represents a
doubling of the Warsaw Convention's liability limits, in reality
the increase in liability amounted to much less because of rising
costs due to inflation and because attorneys' fees would signifi-
cantly decrease the am6unt that was actually received by a plain-
tiff.2 '9 This increase was not sufficient to appease the U.S.
government's concerns over the deficiency of the liability limits
of the Warsaw Convention, and the United States never ratified
the amendment set forth at the Hague Conference. An Inter-
agency Group on International Aviation study, after much re-
view and many public hearings, made two recommendations to
24 ICAO Legal Committee, Report On the Revision of the Warsaw Convention,




27 Peter Martin, 50 Years of the Warsaw Convention: A Practical Man's Guide, 4
ANNALS AIR & SPACE L. 233, 234 (1979).
28 Sheinfeld, supra note 2, at 660; see also Hague Protocol, supra note 16, at 381-
83.
29 Sheinfeld, supra note 2, at 660.
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the United States Secretary of State. 30 First, the study recom-
mended continued efforts to attempt to ratify the Hague Proto-
col.3' Second, the agency recommended compulsory insurance
to complement the Hague Protocol's liability limits.3 2 The U.S.
Congress failed to take action on the compulsory insurance rec-
ommendation.33  The U.S. government determined that with-
drawal from the Warsaw Convention was necessary to best
protect American airline travellers.3 4 Solely because of the War-
saw Convention's low liability limits for personal injury or death,
the United States denounced the Warsaw Convention.35 The
United States indicated, however, that it would withdraw the de-
nunciation under two conditions. First, the ICAO Conference
in February of 1966 must give reason to believe that a new con-
vention with a U.S. $100,000 limit could be a distinct possibility.
Second, major international air carriers must be able to work
out an interim agreement under article 22 of the Warsaw Con-
vention with a U.S. $75,000 liability limit.3 6
30 United States Dep't of State, The Warsaw Convention-Recent Developments and
the Withdrawal of the United States Denunciation, 32 J. AIR L. & CoM. 243, 244
(1966). The Interagency Group on International Aviation is a group of repre-





34 Id Without compulsory insurance legislation "reliance on the common law"
would allow for the greatest recovery of damages for personal injury or death in
air travel accidents. Id.
35 U.S. Gives Notice of Denunciation of Warsaw Convention, 53 DEP'T ST. BULL. 923,
923-24 (1965). The notice of denunciation read in part:
The United States of America wishes to state that it gives this notifi-
cation solely because of the low limits for liability for death or per-
sonal injury provided in the Warsaw Convention, even as those
limits would be increased by the Protocol to amend the Convention
done at The Hague on September 28, 1955 .... To this end, the
United States of America stands ready to participate in the negotia-
tion of a revision of the Warsaw Convention which would provide
substantially higher limits, or of a convention covering the other
matters contained in the Warsaw Convention and Hague Protocol
but without limits of liability for personal injury or death.
Id. at 924-25.
36 Id. at 924; see also Warsaw Convention, supra note 1, at art. 22.
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1. Justifications for U.S. Denunciation and a Compromise That
Saves the Warsaw Convention
There is an inherent abhorrence in the United States against
artificially restricting the amount of compensation for personal
injury or death. 7 Limiting the amount of compensation unduly
places the burden of loss on the victim or on the victim's
family.38
Under article 39 of the Warsaw Convention, a country may
denounce the Warsaw Convention at any time as long as the
country provides proper notification.3 9 This denunciation be-
comes effective six months after the notice is tendered by the
country.40 Since the United States accounts for over sixty per-
cent of all international air travel passengers, U.S. denunciation
would irreparably harm the integrity and stability of the Warsaw
Convention and jeopardize adherence to it by other nations. In
an effort to prevent the United States from proceeding with its
denunciation of the Warsaw Convention, the International Air
Transportation Association (IATA) convened a special meeting
in Montreal in the early part of 1966. The goal of the meeting
was to form an agreement among air carriers that would assuage
the United States' grave concerns over the Warsaw Convention's
liability limits. 41 An agreement was reached among interna-
tional air carriers serving the United States that increased strict
liability limits to U.S. $75,000 gross of legal fees or U.S. $58,000
net of legal fees.42 This agreement applied only to air carriers
who had signed the agreement and only to international trans-
portation, including the United States.43 It took effect when a
location within the United States was either the point of origin,
37 Lee S. Kreindler, The Denunciation of the Warsaw Convention, 31 J. AiR L. &
CoM. 291, 293 (1965).
38 Id.
39 Warsaw Convention, supra note 1, at art. 39.
40 Id. The full text states:
(1) Any one of the High Contracting Parties may denounce this
convention by a notification addressed to the Government of the
Republic of Poland, which shall at once inform the Government of
each of the High Contracting Parties.
(2) Denunciation shall take effect six months after the notification
of denunciation, and shall operate only as regards the party which
shall have proceeded to denunciation.
Id.





point of destination, or an agreed stopping point of an interna-
tional flight.4 4 The agreement also stipulated that the air carri-
ers that were parties to the agreement would furnish passengers
with a written notice in ten-point type advising them of the lia-
bility limitations that were established by the Warsaw Conven-
tion, the Hague Protocol, or the higher limit imposed by the
agreement.45 While this agreement was merely a private agree-
ment that did not rise to the force of law accorded a treaty, the
agreement did allow the United States to withdraw its denuncia-
tion of the Warsaw Convention.46
D. THE GUATEMALA CONFERENCE: SUPPLEMENTAL
COMPENSATION PLANS AND LIMITS AND RESERVATIONS
In 1971, at the ICAO International Conference on Air Law at
Guatemala City, Guatemala, the United States proposed new
compensation limits for international air travel. The United
States suggested a liability limit of U.S. $100,000. 4 7 Also, a sup-
plemental compensation plan was proposed to pay for claims in
excess of U.S. $100,000.48 This supplemental compensation
plan was to be financed by contributions made by the passen-
gers.49 At the ICAO conference, it was decided that, for the
agreement to take effect, thirty countries would have to ratify
the agreement.5" It was furthermore stipulated that five of the
thirty countries would have to comprise forty percent of air
travel of ICAO member nations. 1 Unfortunately, Article H of
the Guatemala agreement limited the reservations that a coun-
try could make at the time of ratification.5 " Only a few reserva-
tions were allowed.55 For example, any state whose courts were
not allowed to award damages could reserve that article 22
would not apply to its courts.54 A state could also declare that




47 ICAO International Conference on Air Law, Guatemala City, at 76, ICAO
Doc. 9040-C/167-2 (1972) [hereinafter Guatemala Proceedings].
48 Id.
49 Id. at 77-78.
50 Id. at 179.
51 Id.
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when military personnel were carried on the aircraft.55 Finally, a
state could declare that the Warsaw Convention and its amend-
ments did not apply to "the carriage of persons, cargo, and bag-
gage."5 6 Twenty-two nations ratified the Guatemala Protocol,
but the U.S. Senate refused to ratify it because of.the limit on
reservations.57 Since the airlines of the United States com-
prised a large part of the world's air traffic, without the ratifica-
tion of the United States, the Guatemala Protocol became
basically a dead issue.
E. THE MONTREAL PROTOCOL No. 3 INTRODUCES THE
STANDARD DRAWING RIGHT TO ALLOW LIABILITY LIMITS
TO KEEP UP WITH INFLATION
The next meeting of the ICAO took place in 1975 in Mon-
treal, Quebec, where another amendment to the Warsaw Con-
vention, known as the Montreal Protocol No. 3, was drafted.58
Some aspects of the Guatemala Protocol, including strict liabil-
ity, were retained in Montreal Protocol No. 3.59 Montreal Proto-
col No. 3 also contained a settlement inducement clause and an
unbreakable liability limit of 100,000 standard drawing rights
(which was approximately U.S. $117,000 at that time) and pro-
vided for an optional supplemental compensation plan.60 An
SDR, a standard drawing right, is "a monetary unit based on the
exchange rates for British, French, German, Japanese, and U.S.
currencies." 1 This specialized unit of exchange eliminated one
of the major criticisms of the Warsaw Convention's liability lim-
its, specifically the failure of limits to keep up 'with the rising
costs of inflation. 6' The supplemental compensation plan was
to provide compensation beyond the strict liability limits if pas-
sengers paid a set surcharge on their tickets for extra liability
insurance.6 The settlement inducement plan provided air car-
riers with an incentive to settle claims within a period of six
55 Id.
56 Id
57 Sheinfeld, supra note 2, at 677.
58 ICAO International Conference on Air Law, Montreal, ICAO Doc. 9154-
LC/174-2 (1975).
59 Hearings on Aviation Protocols Before the Comm. on Foreign Relations, 95th Cong.,
1st Sess. 52 (1977) [hereinafter Hearings].
60 Id.
61 Stacy Shapiro, Debate Rages'on Airline Liability Caps, Bus. INs., Mar. 15, 1993,
at 3.
62 See Sheinfeld, supra note 2, at 659-60.
63 Hearings, supra note 59, at 52.
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months." The air carriers would be forced to pay added costs,
including attorneys' fees, if a court subsequently awarded a
plaintiff more than the airline had offered.65
F. THE U.S. RESPONSE TO THE MONTREAL PROTOCOL No. 3
In July of 1977, the Civil Aeronautics Board approved a sup-
plemental compensation plan. This plan provided for an addi-
tional U.S. $200,000 recovery, above the U.S. $117,000 for loss
of life. 66 This plan also provided for unlimited medical cover-
age.67 Under this plan, the surcharge per ticket was to be two
dollars.68 The two-dollar fee went toward establishing a fund to
pay for the supplemental recoveries.69
The Senate Committee on Foreign Relations supported ratifi-
cation of the Montreal Protocol.70 The Committee expressed a
concern that the failure to ratify the Montreal Protocol could
undermine United States influence within the Civil Aviation Or-
ganization and lead to the end of the Warsaw Convention.7'
The Senate Committee concluded that participation by the
United States in a limited liability system was warranted because
of the special concerns of international aviation.72 Participation
in such a system, however, was predicated on the system ensur-
ing "sure and sufficient compensation" supplemented by a do-
mestic compensation plan to increase recoveries for U.S.
citizens.73
The Montreal Protocol No. 3 was defeated in 1983 when it
failed to achieve the ratification of the U.S. Senate.7 4 Since
then, several supplemental compensation plans have been pro-
posed, but so far, none have been approved by the Senate.75
64 Marian Nash Leich, Current Development: The Montreal Protocols to the Warsaw






70 S. EXEC. REP. No. 45, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 4-7 (1981).
71 Leich, supra note 64, at 414.
72 I&
73 Id.
74 Sheinfeld, supra note 2, at 681. See also Robert Rice, An Airline Decision Born
of Embarrassment, FIN. TIMES, Nov. 19, 1992, at 5; Robert Rice, Business and the Law:
Airlines Opt to Fly on a Wing and a Prayer-Compensation Leaves Travellers Cold, FIN.
TIMES, Nov. 23, 1993, at 16; Shapiro, supra note 61, at 3.
75 Stacy Shapiro, Warsaw Convention Apparently Here to Stay: Most Airlines Would
Rather Raise Limits of Liability Than Abandon Them, Bus. INS., Apr. 11, 1994, at 10.
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Until a viable supplemental compensation plan is approved, rati-
fication by the United States of the Montreal Protocol No. 3 can-
not occur. 6 As a result, like the Guatemala Protocol, the
Montreal Protocol No. 3 may remain a moot issue. 7
III. THE JAPANESE INITIATIVE,
The Warsaw Convention has been criticized for not ade-
quately compensating passengers in the event of an airline acci-
dent.78 In an effort to avoid the liability limitations imposed by
the Warsaw Convention, many plaintiffs have engaged in
lengthy and expensive court battles. 79 Some of these court bat-
tes have served to increase the areas where plaintiffs can re-
cover damages under the Warsaw Convention.8 ° Other cases
have been undertaken in an effort to find a basis for recovery
that does not fall under the Warsaw Convention's liability limits.
A. EXTENSION OF THE WARSAW CONVENTION TO APPLY TO
CHARTER FLIGHTS
A litigious area of the Warsaw Convention concerns its appli-
cability to charter flights. One example is Block v. Compagnie Na-
tionale Air France,81 a case involving an effort on the part of the
plaintiffs to prove that the Warsaw Convention did not apply to
charter flights. If the plaintiffs could have proven that the War-
saw Convention's liability limits were not intended to apply to
charter flights, then recovery would not have been limited. In
Block, an Air France Boeing 707jet beginning the last part of the
trip on an Atlanta-Paris-Atlanta flight crashed at Orly Field in
Paris, France. All 122 passengers on the charter flight were
killed. The plaintiffs wanted the court to remove the Warsaw
Convention's liability limits from the accident because at that
time compensation would have only amounted to U.S. $8300.
After five years of court battles, the United States Court of Ap-
peals for the Fifth Circuit undertook an extensive investigation
into the legislative history of the Warsaw Convention and deter-
mined that the Warsaw Convention was based on "the existence
of a contract of carriage between the air carrier and the passen-
76 Sheinfeld, supra note 2, at 678.
77 See Shapiro, supra note 75, at 10.
78 See Sheinfeld, supra note 2, at 656.
79 Id.
80 Id.
81 386 F.2d 323 (5th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 392 U.S. 905 (1968).
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ger." 2 The court further stated that the contract existed when-
ever a "passenger is transported"; therefore, the Warsaw
Convention also governed international charter flights."3 This
decision defined the parameters of application of the Warsaw
Convention between an air carrier and a passenger. It also
found a contractual basis for the Warsaw Convention's
application. 4
B. LITIGATION TO AVOID THE WARSAW CONVENTION'S
LIABILITY LIMITS BY PROVING WILLFUL MISCONDUCT
Other court battles have been undertaken in an effort to
prove willful misconduct by air carriers in order to remove the
Warsaw Convention's liability cap.8 5 Under article 25, an air car-
rier cannot invoke the Warsaw Convention's liability limits if the
air carrier is guilty of willful misconduct.8 6. In Abranson v. Japan
Airlines Co., 87 a passenger with a pre-existing paraesophageal
hiatal hernia sued Japan Airlines when his condition worsened
on an international flight from New York to Tokyo. Japan Air-
lines staff refused to allow the passenger to lie down in order to
apply a self-help remedy to alleviate his condition. Airline per-
sonnel insisted that no empty seats were available, although
there were in fact nine empty seats in first class. The court de-
termined that the aggravation of a pre-existing medical condi-
tion during an international flight did not fall within the
definition of an "accident" as defined in the Warsaw Conven-
tion.8 8 Therefore, no claim could be brought under the Warsaw
Convention.89
In Walker v. Eastern Air Lines,90 the district court also con-
cluded that the aggravation of a pre-existing medical condition
82 Id. at 353.
83 1&
84 Id.
85 See, e.g., Abramson v.Japan Airlines Co., 739 F.2d 130 (3d Cir. 1984) (plain-
tiff attempted to prove that the air carrier's refusal to aid him in completing a
self-help remedy constituted willful misconduct), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1059
(1985); Walker v. Eastern Air Lines, 785 F. Supp. 1168 (S.D.N.Y. 1992) (passen-
ger's widow attempted to prove that the air carrier's negligence in allowing a
passenger with an aggravated pre-existing medical condition to board constituted
willful misconduct).
86 Warsaw.Convention, supra note 1, at art. 25.
87 Abramson, 739 F.2d at 130.
88 Id. at 133.
89 Id. at 135.
90 785 F. Supp. 1168 (S.D.N.Y. 1992).
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did not fall within the definition of an "accident" under the
Warsaw Convention. 91 In that case, a passenger with a congeni-
tal asthmatic condition died on a round-trip flight from New
York to Jamaica, a flight that had an agreed stopping place in
Miami, Florida. A four-year court battle ensued in an effort by
the passenger's widow to prove that the actions of Eastern Air-
lines constituted'willful misconduct on the part of the air carrier
under theWarsaw Convention.92
In Eastern Airlines, Inc. v. F/oyd,93 a six-year court battle was un-'
successfully undertaken to obtain a ruling that the Warsaw Con-
vention applied to mental injury that was unaccompanied by
physical trauma. The appellate court held that claims for pure
mental distress fell within the actions allowed by the Warsaw
Convention.94 On the flight from Miami to Nassau, Bahamas,
one of three plane engines lost oil pressure, forcing the flight to
return to Miami. When the second and third engines failed, the
passengers were informed that the plane would have to ditch in
the Atlantic Ocean. Fortunately, the crew was able to restart the
first engine and the plane landed safely in Miami. On appeal,
the U.S. Supreme Court determined that psychic injury alone
was not recoverable under article 17 of the Warsaw
Convention. 5
Finally, in In re Korean Air Lines Disaster of Sept. 1, 1983,96 a
nine-year court battle ensued over the downing of a Korean Air
Lines jet by Soviet military aircraft. The Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia held that punitive damage awards were
excluded by the Warsaw Convention. 97 In a related case, the
United States District Court for the Southern District of New
York concluded that, if proven, a plaintiff could recover for the
decedent's conscious pain and suffering, loss of support, loss of
love, affection and companionship, loss of inheritance, and loss
of services.98
Court battles in the United States regarding the Warsaw Con-
vention's liability limits have taken many years and have been
91 Id. at 1170-71.
92 Id. at 1168-71.
93 499 U.S. 530 (1991).
94 Floyd v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 872 F.2d 1462, 1490 (11th Cir. 1984).
95 Eastern Airlines, 499 U.S. at 552.
96 932 F.2d 1474 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 994 (1991).
97 Id. at 1490.
98 In re Korean Air Lines Disaster of Sept. 1, 1983, 807 F. Supp. 1073, 1089
(S.D.N.Y. 1992).
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expensive. 99 Overseas courts have experienced similar court
battles.' In the process, the Warsaw Convention's coverage has
expanded, and many recoveries in excess of the Warsaw Conven-
tion's liability limits have been achieved.
Proposed amendments to the Warsaw Convention attempting
to increase liability limits have not been effective. As quickly as
the amendments are ratified, they become outdated by the ris-
ing costs of inflation."'
C. THE ROLE OF COMPENSATION AND FAULT LIABILITy
Compensation should adequately reflect and be significantly
related to the actual economic losses suffered by the victims of
airline accidents.10 2  Compensation, by its very definition,
should compensate a victim.' 0 3 One of the very basic concepts
of tort liability is that liability is based on fault.104 Anytime an
artificial limit is imposed, such a limit prevents the victim from
obtaining compensation appropriate to the victim's injuries.10 5
By definition, the strict liability limits imposed by the Warsaw
Convention deprive the victim of adequate compensation for
pain and suffering. An individual who is greatly injured should
be compensated greatly, and an individual who is only injured
slightly should be compensated slightly.106
99 See Fayd, 499 U.S. at 530; In re Korean Air Lines Disaster, 932 F.2d at 1475;
Abramson, 739 F.2d at 130; In re Korean Air Lines Disaster, 807 F. Supp. at 1073;
Walker, 785 F. Supp. at 1168; In re Inflight Explosion on TWA, 778 F. Supp. 615, 625
(E.D.N.Y. 1991), rev'd, 975 F.2d 35 (2d Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1944
(1993).
100 Goldman v. Thai Airways Int'l, 1 W.L.R. 1186"(C.A. 1983) (Eng.) (willful
misconduct would be satisfied if the airline agents acted recklessly and with
knowledge that damage would occur); Gurtner v. Beaton, [1993] 2 Lloyd's Rep.
369 (C.A. 1992) (Eng.) (attempt to prove willful misconduct in the crash of a
London, England to Dundee, Scotland charter flight).
10, Goldman, 1 W.L.R. at 1186; Gurtner, [1993] 2 Lloyd's Rep. at 369.
102 P. Jacobs & B. F. Kiker, Accident Compensation for Airline Passengers: An Eco-
nomic Analysis of Liability Rules Under the Warsaw Convention, 51 J. AiR L. & COM.
589, 610 (1986).
10 Lee S. Kreindler, A Plaintiff's View of Montreal, 33J. AIR L. & CoM. 528, 529
(1967).
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D. THE WARSAW CONVENTION'S STRICT LIABILITY DEFEATS THE
PURPOSE OF COMPENSATION
The strict liability of the Warsaw Convention prevents airlines
from defending their actions against plaintiffs who are only
slightly injured. On the other hand, the liability cap prevents
plaintiffs who are severely injured from obtaining adequate
compensation for more significant injuries.10 7 This strict liabil-
ity limit defeats the purpose of compensation for a victim. This
problem was brought to light in the case of Ross v. Pan American
Airways,°s where an American entertainer was seriously injured
in a Pan American Airways crash in Portugal in 1943. Despite
massive injuries and immense medical bills, the award was lim-
ited to a mere U.S. $8300 under the Warsaw Convention's liabil-
ity cap.10 9 The Ross case demonstrated how difficult it was to
prove an air carrier's willful misconduct in order to avoid the
Warsaw Convention's liability limits.110 In a companion case,
the court defined willful misconduct as "an intentional act done
with either intent to cause damage or recklessly and with knowl-
edge that damage would probably result." ' It could prove ex-
tremely difficult to convince a jury that a pilot would
intentionally cause a crash since the pilot's own life would be at
risk.112 Other American cases have defined willful misconduct
as an action done with intent to cause damage or done reck-
lessly without regard for probable consequences. 13 Under this
more flexible definition of willful misconduct, plaintiffs have
won several cases and awarded damages exceeding the Warsaw
Convention's liability limits.1 1 4 Because of cases in which an air
carrier's willful misconduct has been proved, many other cases
107 See Kreindler, supra note 37, at 293.
108 85 N.E.2d 880 (N.Y. 1949).
109 Id. at 884.
110 Kreindler, supra note 37, at 294 (discussing companion case Froman v. Pan
Am. Airways, 135 N.Y.S.2d 619 (App. Div. 1954), cert. denied, 349 U.S. 947 (1955)).
M Id.
112 Id.
113 Koninklijke Luchtvaart Maatschappij v. Tuller, 292 F.2d 775, 778-79 (D.C.
Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 921 (1961); Pekelis v. Transcontinental & Western Air,
187 F.2d 122, 124-25 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 341 U.S. 951 (1951); American Air-
lines v. Ulen, 186 F.2d 529, 533 (D.C. Cir. 1949).
114 LeRoy v. Sabena Belgian World Airlines, 344 F.2d 266 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
382 U.S. 878 (1965); see also Tuler, 292 F.2d at 782 (affirming award of U.S.
$350,000 when evidence supported showing of willful misconduct); U/en, 186




have been settled for amounts in excess of the Warsaw Conven-
tion's liability limits." 5
E. TEN JAPANESE AIRLINES ABANDON THE WARSAW
CONVENTION'S LIABILITY LIMITS: THE JAPANESE LEGAL
SYSTEM'S EMPHASIS ON SETTLEMENT
Amidst all the controversy over the Warsaw Convention's lia-
bility limits, something very interesting happened in Japan. On
November 20, 1992, tenJapanese airlines voluntarily abandoned
the international liability limits of the Warsaw Convention.11 6
The Japanese airlines' decision to abandon liability limits was
preceded by a devastating domestic airline crash in Japan. A
Japan Air Lines Boeing 747 crashed in 1985, killing 529 passen-
gers. 1 7 Since this was a domestic crash, settlements for the
crash were not covered by the Warsaw Convention's liability
limits.
Traditionally, the Japanese legal system encourages settle-
ment. Under this system the plaintiff requests an amount, and
the defendant either gives the plaintiff the requested amount or
the two parties negotiate until a mutually acceptable settlement
is reached. '
In Japan, the tradition is to deal with conflicts through social
arrangements.11 9 Civil disputes are taken to court only as a last
resort.12 0 The Japanese prefer a less adversarial process than liti-
115 Kreindler, supra note 37, at 294-95.
116 Rice, supra note 12, at 1; Rice, An Airline Decision Born of Embarrassment, supra
note 74, at 5.
117 Stacy Shapiro, Debate Rages on Airline Liability Caps, Bus. INS., Mar. 15, 1993,
at 3; Japanese Airlines to Lift Liability Cap, FIN. POST, Nov. 19, 1992, at 10; 10 Air-
lines Drop Warsaw Limits, Bus. INS., Nov. 23, 1992, at 2.
's See ROBERT C. CHRISTOPHER, THE JAPANESE MIND 165 (1983) (discussing
howJapanese police frequently negotiate financial settlements between the par-
ties to a traffic collision at the site of the accident).
119 CHRISTOPHER, supra note 118, at 164-65; see alsoJ. Mark Ramseyer, The Costs
of the Consensual Myth: Antitrust Enforcement and Institutional Barriers to Litigation in
Japan, 94 YALE L.J. 604, 607-12 (1985) (discussing the Japanese "non-litigious
ethos").
120 CHRISTOPHER, supra note 120, at 165. See generally YOSHYuKI NODA, INTRO-
DUcnON TO JAPANESE LAW 182 (Anthony Angelo trans., ed. 1976). Most often a
damage case is settled by the victims renouncing their right to indemnity. The
person causing the damage offers both an apology and a sum of money. Even
though the amount offered is often less than the damage incurred, the victim
accepts the amount offered because the victim values sincere remorse over the
money. In rare cases, the victim may be the one who initiates the action by seek-
ing reparation from the person who caused the injury. In such cases, the victim
asks an important member of the community with influence over the person who
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gation, valuing "harmony and compromise" to reach agree-
ments that collectively benefit Japanese society.' 21 Because of
the availability of mediation, and the far-reaching interdepen-
dent relationships characteristic ofJapanese society, fewer bene-
fits are achieved by litigation. 122 Between the years 1977 and
1982, there were two Japan Air Lines crashes in which a total of
fifty-seven people were killed.1 23 Only one civil damage suit was
brought against Japan Air Lines; the majority of claimants
worked out private settlements with the airline company. 24 The
settlements varied depending on the "victim's age, salary and
family obligations." 125
Taking someone to court in Japan constitutes a "breach of the
community harmony" as a lawsuit evidences a "miscarriage of
the social process." 126 In view of the prevailing Japanese mores
and standards, it is easier to understand why Japan Air Lines
privately settled with the passengers in the Boeing 747 crash.
Settlements averaged U.S. $800,000 per passenger.1 27 This set-
tlement figure established a legal precedent for compensation
under Japanese law. 128 After this precedent was set, it would
have been dishonorable for Japanese airlines to continue oper-
ating under the liability limits set by the Warsaw Convention.129
Japanese domestic liability limits had been scrapped in 1982.130
Then, because of the precedent set by the settlements in the
1985 Japan Air Lines crash and embarrassment over the Warsaw
Convention's limits on international compensation, ten Japa-
nese airlines decided to take advantage of article 22, section 1 of
the Warsaw Convention. 3 1 Article 22(1) specifically allows air-
lines to "opt out" of the liability limits established by the Warsaw
caused the injury to initiate settlement. The victim rarely goes to court, but even
in this case, an "amicable settlement" is desired. Nonjudicial procedures are
more honorable and desirable because "they save face for both parties." Id.
121 Koichiro Fujikura, Administering Justice in a Consensus-Based Sociey, 91 MIcH.
L. REV. 1529, 1541 (1993) (reviewing JOHN 0. HALEY, AUTHORITY WITHOUT
POWER: LAW AND THE JAPANESE PARADOX (1991)).
122 Id. at 1539.




127 10 Airlines Drop Warsaw Limits, supra note 117, at 2.
128 Id
129 Id.
130 Robert Rice, Japanese Airlines to Scrap Limit on Liability for Victims, FIN. TIMES,
Nov. 19, 1992, at 1.
131 Id.; Rice, An Airline Decision Born of Embarrassment, supra note 74, at 5.
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Convention.13 2 Under article 22, an airline may "contract pri-
vately for higher liability awards."1 3 3
F. How THE JAPANESE WITHDREW FROM THE WARSAW
CONVENTION'S LIAILITY LIMITS
In order to effectuate the removal of Japanese airlines from
the Warsaw Convention's liability limits, two paragraphs con-
cerning passenger liability on international flights were added
to the air carriers' conditions of carriage. 134 The first paragraph
stated: "Each airline shall not apply the applicable limit in arti-
cle 22(1) of the Warsaw Convention in defense of any claim aris-
ing out of the death, wounding or other bodily injury of a
passenger within the meaning of the convention." 135 This para-
graph clearly informed the passenger that the flight was not cov-
ered by the Warsaw Convention's liability limits. The second
paragraph added to the conditions of carriage that "[e]ach air-
line shall not use any defense for negligence as stated in Article
20(1) of the Warsaw Convention up to 100,000 SDRs [standard
drawing rights worth U.S. $137,500], but will use those defenses
thereafter, excluding legal costs awarded by a court. "136 This
waiver of Warsaw Convention liability limits applied only tojapa-
nese airlines and not to any other airline involved in inter-air-
line tickets.13 7
At the end of 1992, the Japanese airline Al Nippon Airways
requested approval of the waiver of Warsaw Convention liability
limits from the United States Department of Transportation. 138
312 The Warsaw Convention, supra note 1, at art. 22. Article 22(1) states:
In the transportation of passengers the liability of the carrier for
each passenger shall be limited to the sum of 125,000 francs.
Where, in accordance with the law of the court to which the case is
submitted, damages may be awarded in the form of periodical pay-
ments, the equivalent capital value of the said payments shall not
exceed 125,000 francs. Nevertheless, by special contract, the carrier
and the passenger may agree to a higher limit of liability.
Id., (emphasis added).
133 Howard T. Edelman, Mass Torts: Punitive Damages Crash in the Second Circuit:
In re Air Disaster at Lockerbie, Scotland on December 21, 1988, 58 BROOK. L.
REv. 497, 499 n.5 (1992) (citing Rice, Japanese Airlines to Scrap Limit on Liability for
Victims, supra note 130, at 1; Rice, An Airline Decision Born of Embarrassment, supra
note 74, at 5).
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The Department of Transportation agreed to Al Nippon's ex-
emption because the Montreal Agreement did not preclude
waiving liability for amounts higher than U.S. $75,000.139
Higher liability limits, or unlimited liability as proposed by the
Japanese, afforded the traveling public additional protection.1 40
The Department of Transportation determined that releasing Al
Nippon Airways from the liability limits of the Warsaw Conven-
tion was "consistent with the public interest of the United
States." 41 OtherJapanese airlines are expected to follow suit.142
G. INITIAL REACTION TO THE JAPANESE INITIATIVE
Supporters of the Japanese Initiative believe that removal of
Warsaw Convention liability limits will decrease litigation. 4 '
Plaintiffs enter into litigation in an attempt to prove an air car-
rier's willful misconduct, thereby increasing their damage
awards.' 44 Litigation is costly and time consuming, and it
defeats the original purpose of the Warsaw Convention. 4 5 Liti-
gation has also been contradictory and confusing, since several
countries, including the United States and Japan, have no set
liability limits for domestic flights. 146 Further complicating mat-
ters is the fact that under the Warsaw Convention, passengers on
the same flight suffering from the exact same injuries may re-
ceive different amounts in damage awards.1 47 Different citizen-
ships affect the choice of law that is utilized in any given
passenger suit; therefore, depending on where the suit is
brought, compensation values will vary.1 48 Proponents of the
Japanese Initiative believe that contracting out of Warsaw Con-
vention liability limits, as the majorJapanese airlines have done,
is the best way to prevent inequities in compensation to airline
139 Id.
140 Id.
141 Id. (quoting statement by George N. Tompkins, Jr., an aviation defense law-




145 Kreindler, supra note 37, at 294-95.
146 See generally Cagle, supra note 10, at 953-54 (noting that although the War-
saw Convention was intended to create uniformity in liability limits, four damage
limits are in use).




crash victims. 149 Fixed liability limits allow for damages to be
based on fault, rather than strict liability. 50
Opponents of the Japanese Initiative want to retain some
form of liability limits within the realm of the Warsaw Conven-
tion's original goals. Aviation under-writers, in particular, op-
pose unlimited liability such as that enacted by the Japanese
airlines.151 Airline insurers are afraid that unlimited liability on
international flights will cause an increase in underwriting
losses. 152 Underwriters plan to charge airlines that have con-
tracted for unlimited liability a premium surcharge to cover in-
creased costs.153
Air carrier underwriters are also fearful that the Japanese plan
may allow liability limits on baggage and cargo to be removed.1 54
Underwriters fear that without liability limits on baggage, pas-
sengers will claim that their bags contain very expensive de-
signer clothes. 155 Litigators counter underwriters' fears by-
emphasizing the potential savings through waiver of Warsaw
Convention liability limits since litigation cosp, paid by the in-
surers, will be greatly reduced.1 56
The European Community to date has not embraced the Jap-
anese waiver of the Warsaw Convention's liability limits. In-
stead, the European Community wants to retain the Warsaw
149 George N. Tompkins, Remarks at the New York County Lawyers Association
Evening Forum-The Japanese Initiative: Absolute Unlimited Liability in Inter-
nationalAir Travel 9-15 (Feb. 3, 1994) (transcript available from Esquire Report-
ing Company, Inc.), reprinted in 60J. AIR L. & COM. 819, 821-33 (1995).
150 Kreindler, supra note 103, at 537.
15, Shapiro, supra note 61, at 3.
152 Id.
153 Id.
154 Id; Warsaw Convention, supra note 1, at arts. 18 and 22(2). Article 22(2)
states:
In the transportation of checked baggage and of goods, the liability
of the carrier shall be limited to a sum of 250 francs per kilogram,
unless the consignor has made, at the time when the package was
handed over to the carrier, a special declaration of the value at
delivery and has paid a supplementary sum if the case so requires.
In that case the carrier will be liable to pay a sum not exceeding the
declared sum, unless he proves that that sum is greater than the
actual value to the consignor at delivery.
Id. This amounts to "about $9 per pound of checked baggage and $400 per
passenger for unchecked baggage." Shapiro, supra note 61, at 4.
155 Id.
156 Id Removal of the Warsaw Convention's liability limits would decrease the
costly and lengthy litigation necessary to prove willful misconduct. Id.
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Convention's liability limits.1 57 The European Commission,
however, proposed in October of 1992 that the per passenger
liability limit be raised to 250,000 SDRs. 58 The European Com-
mission plan also includes optional first-party insurance from
the air carriers allowing compensation above the 250,000 SDR
limit. 159
British air carriers have not moved to increase their liability
limits, but they are not adverse to an increase to liability limits by
the British Department of Transportation.1 60 The Australian
Department of Transportation and Communication is currently
investigating proposals from the airline industry concerning in-
creasing liability limits to a potential high of U.S. $750,000.161
No U.S. air carrier has followed the Japanese example and con-
tracted out of Warsaw Convention liability limits.162 Instead, the
U.S. Department of Transportation's supplementary compensa-
tion plan proposed in 1989 continues to receive support.1 6 The
proposed supplementary compensation plan provides unlimited
recovery for economic damages to U.S. citizens and residents on
international flights, subject to a limit of U.S. $500 million per
incident per aircraft.1 64 This plan was amended in 1993 to give
the Secretary of Transportation the power to set the supplemen-
tal compensation plan's liability limits.1 65 As of April 1994, the
supplemental compensation plan has stalled once in Congress
and is not on the Senate's present agenda.1 66 With the supple-
mentary compensation plan stalled in Congress, most U.S. air
carriers are contemplating voluntarily increasing the Warsaw
Convention's liability limits.1 67
157 Id at 3.
158 Id. 250,000 SDRs are approximately U.S. $343,750. Id.
159 Id.
160 Shapiro, supra note 75, at 10.
161 Id
162 Shapiro, supra note 61, at 4.
163 Id.






IV. WHAT DOES THE JAPANESE WAIVER OF THE
LIABILITY LIMITATION REALLY MEAN AND
WHERE IS THE AIRLINE INDUSTRY
GOING?
A. WHAT IS THE TRUE EFFECT OF THE JAPANESE INITIATIVE?
The Japanese Initiative does not provide absolute unlimited
liability in international air travel.1 68 Actually, the Japanese Initi-
ative returns the Warsaw Convention to true fault-based liabil-
ity.169 The Japanese amendment to the airline's conditions of
carriage achieves this sense of fault-based liability by removing
the liability limitations of any international treaty concerning
passenger personal injury or death from an accident covered by
article 17 of the Warsaw Convention. 170 The Convention's arti-
cle 20 defenses are waived up to the 100,000 SDR limit, but for
compensation over 100,000 SDRs, the defenses are reinstated.1 7 1
Since the defenses are waived up to the treaty's liability limits,
there is no need for the ticketing requirement of article 3 or the
willful misconduct provision of article 25.172 In essence, the Jap-
168 Panel Discussion, The Japanese Initiative: Absolute Unlimited Liability in Interna-
tional Air Trave4 60J. AIR L. & COM. 819, 822 (Joseph J. Asselta & Lee S. Krein-
dler, Chairs, 1995) (statements by George N. Tompkins, Jr.) [hereinafter Panel
Discussion].
169 Id.
170 Id. The Japanese airlines' amendment to their conditions of carriage
removes the liability limitations of "the Warsaw Convention, the Hague Protocol,
the Montreal Agreement or any other international treaty that may come along."
Id. See generally Warsaw Convention, supra note 1, at art. 17.
171 Panel Discussion, supra note 168, at 822; see generally Warsaw Convention,
supra note 1, at art. 20.
172 Panel Discussion, supra note 168, at 822-23; see Warsaw Convention, supra
note 1, at art. 3. The full text of article 3 states:
(1) For the transportation of passengers the carrier must deliver
a passenger ticket which must contain the following particulars:
(a) The place and date of issue; (b) The place of departure and of
destination; (c) The agreed stopping places, provided that the car-
rier may reserve the right to alter the stopping places in case of
necessity, and that if he exercises that right, the alteration shall not
have the effect of depriving the transportation of its international
character; (d) The name and address of the carrier or carriers; (e)
A statement that the transportation is subject to the rules relating
to liability established by this convention.
(2) The absence, irregularity, or loss of the passenger ticket shall
not affect the existence or the validity of the contract of transporta-
tion, which shall none the less be subject to the rules of this conven-
tion. Nevertheless, if the carrier accepts a passenger without a
passenger ticket having been delivered he shall. not be entitled to
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anese Initiative merely allows the Japanese airlines to negotiate
settlements that exceed the Warsaw Convention's limitation of
liability, without requiring passengers' families to resort to
lengthy litigation to prove willful misconduct by the air
carrier.1 7 3
The purpose behind reinstating article 20 defenses for claims
greater than 100,000 SDRs is to protect the air carrier from
claims made by third parties. 174 The air carrier needs to be pro-
tected from claims by air manufacturers and air traffic control
facilities. By waiving article 20 defenses, the airline risks becom-
ing a "volunteer," and may not be entitled to seek indemnifica-
tion from a responsible third party. 175 Therefore, reinstitution
of the article 20 defenses allows the air carrier to negotiate set-
tlements with passengers' families that exceed Warsaw Conven-
tion liability limits without prejudicing the air carrier's own
claims for indemnification against any liable third parties. 76
B. PROBLEMS WITH THE JAPANESE INITIATWE
Compensation is one important aspect of the tort system, but
arguably a concomitantly important purpose is the exposition of
fault. 177 Tort system litigation exposes fault and lack of care,
and also determines the underlying facts in airline crashes.178
While the Japanese Initiative solves the problem of compensa-
tion, it does nothing to replace the investigative aspect of the
tort system.179
George Tompkins, an adviser to Japan Air Lines in formulat-
ing the Japanese Initiative, credits the investigative aspect of the
tort system for finding the exact cause of the Lockerbie crash.18 °
Plaintiffs' attorneys in the Lockerbie case examined witnesses,
avail himself of those provisions of this convention which exclude
or limit his liability.
Id.
173 Panel Discussion, supra note 168, at 823; see also Peter Martin & Trevor
French, Blown Cover: Japanese Airlines Have Unilaterally Opted for Unlimited Passenger
Liability, AIRLINE Bus., Feb. 1993, at 44.
174 Panel Discussion, supra note 168, at 823.
175 Id.
176 Id. at 823-24.
177 Id. at 828.
178 Id.
179 Id. at 828-29.
180 Id. at 829. See generally In re Air Disaster at Lockerbie, Scotland on Dec. 21,
1988, 928 F.2d 1267 (2d Cir.) (litigation stemming from an act of terrorism), cert.
denied, 502 U.S. 920 (1991).
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examined the Frankfurt base of Pan Am, took testimony from
baggage and x-ray machine handlers and examined security per-
sonnel."" The litigation aspect of the tort system focused on
causation, which helped explain what went wrong in the Lock-
erbie crash, and helped make air travel safer for all
passengers. 182
Tompkins further points to the Sabena Airlines crash of 1961
as proof of the investigative purpose served by the tort system.18 3
It took three years of litigation against Boeing Airlines to dis-
cover the cause of the Sabena crash." 4 The plaintiffs' attorneys
found no way to break liability limits concerning the airline, but
they were able to pursue litigation against the manufacturer of
the airplane.18 5 The lawsuit helped disclose the design errors
that caused the crash.1 8 6
Since early settlements prevent investigation into airline
crashes, Tompkins recommends an alternative plan: denounc-
ing the Warsaw Convention altogether.18 1 Without the Warsaw
Convention, air crashes would be handled in the same way as
domestic air crashes in the United States.1 88 A free tort system
based on negligence has no liability limitation.1 8 9 Tompkins
concludes, "The best way to protect the public, recognizing the
need for adequate compensation on the one hand, but also rec-
ognizing the need to keep society protected, to protect itself
from malfeasance and to protect future accidents, is to de-
nounce Warsaw." 9 °
C. CRITICISMS OF THE CLAIM THAT THE TORT SYSTEM LENDS
ITSELF TO EXPOSING FAULT
The tort system does not necessarily lend itself to exposing
fault to the public. 9 In order to receive compensation, plain-
181 Panel Discussion, supra note 168, at 829.
182 Id. at 830.
183 Id.; see generally Leroy v. Sabena Belgian World Airlines, 344 F.2d 266 (2d.
Cir.) (discussing willful misconduct by an airline crew when the flight crashed
into a mountainside), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 878 (1965).
184 Panel Discussion, supra note 168, at 830-31.
185 Id. at 830.
186 Id. at 831.
187 Id.
188 Id. at 831.
189 Id. at 832.
190 Id. at 833.
191 Id. at 834 (statements by Warren L. Dean, special counsel, Air Transport
Association).
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tiffs and their attorneys must sign protective orders. preventing
them from disclosing any information about the case. 192 There-
fore, the premise that the tort system functions to expose de-
fects in widely used products is false.1 93 The tort system's true
function is to provide for recovery, not to discover exactly what
,happened.194 The tort system is not designed to be a "safety
watchdog."19'
Even if the tort system did serve some expository function,
there is a greater cost that must be considered. 196 Because of
the lengthy litigation inherent in the tort system, people are de-
prived of compensation for many years. 197 The financial and
emotional costs of the discovery process are immense.1 98 Some-
times immediate economic compensation is more important
than the satisfaction of finding out what caused the accident. 199
Any time parties go through the litigation process to establish
fault, they must also go through the discovery process.2 0 0 This
process inevitably takes a great deal of time. 1
Rather than abandon the Warsaw Convention, Warren Dean
suggests, the treaty must be modified.2 0 2 "We must have rules
that people can understand and rely upon, and we must have a
system that works to bridge the awkwardness and difficulty of
the international air transportation system that people encoun-
ter in attempting to get compensation for their losses."203 The
treaty serves to create obligations for governments, and one of
those obligations is that governments "cannot pass laws that pro-
hibit compensation to victims of air crashes." 20 4
192 Id.
193 Id.
194 Id. at 834-35 (discussing the KAL 007 litigation and the fact that the truth
may never be known about what happened in that crash).




199 IM (discussing the value of compensation in the present to pay for once-in-
a-lifetime events such as sending a child to college).
200 Id. at 835-36.
201 Id. at 835 (discussing the great length of time involved in obtaining deposi-
tions and the complexity of the discovery process).
2 Id. at 836.
203 Id.
204 Id. at 837.
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Since the United States apparently will not pass the Montreal
Protocol anytime soon, °5 another solution will need to be
found. The Japanese Initiative is something that the United
States should consider seriously.20 The International Air Trans-
port Association has filed a petition before the Department of
Transportation seeking ."discussion authority and antitrust im-
munity" to consider special contracts like the Japanese Initia-
tive.20 7 Air carriers need this authority and immunity to enter
into joint discussions on liability issues.208 Without such permis-
sion, the air carriers would be in violation of United States anti-
trust laws.209 The petition is pending at the present time.2 10
D. WHERE DO THE AIRLINEs Go FROM HERE?
Some aviation underwriters have alleged that removing the
Warsaw Convention liability limits will increase insurance premi-
ums, thereby costing the airline industry more than it will save
in decreased litigation costs.21I The allegation, however, has no
basis. For example, premiums for liability coverage for passen-
gers amounted to U.S. $150 million in 1989.1 Even if under-
writers increased premiums by fifty percent to cover increased
litigation costs resulting from unlimited liability, airlines would
only have to pay U.S. $37.5 million more than they are presently
paying.21 3 In 1989, there were approximately one billion airline
passengers. 14 In order to pay for the increased insurance costs,
passengers would have to expend an additional four cents per
ticket purchased. 21 Therefore, the allegation that unlimited lia-
bility would be more costly to airline industry than protracted
litigation seems to be unfounded.
Assuming that unlimited liability is not prohibitively expen-
sive for the airline industry, what then are the benefits of unlim-
ited liability to the airline industry? After all, it would not be
205 Sheinfeld, supra note 2, at 681; see also Rice, Business and the Law, supra note
74, at 16; Rice, An Airline Decision Born of Embarrassment, supra note 74, at 5.
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economically advantageous to the airlines to advertise that pas-
sengers can now recover more money if they are killed in plane
crashes.216 The benefit to the airline may not be obvious until
the airline has had an accident. Then, the waiver of liability lim-
its "will be of inestimable value." 21 7 The additional premiums
needed to pay for unlimited liability are small compared to the
airlines' other essential costs and to the benefit incurred
through the avoidance of lengthy litigation.218 In view of the
availability of contracting out of Warsaw Convention liability lim-
its, failure to do so is likely to bring "severe criticism" to an air-
line that then suffers an accident.2 1 9
One non-economic criticism of the Japanese contracting out
of Warsaw Convention liability limits is that passengers on the
same flight may be subject to different contractual terms be-
cause of operating agreements with other airlines.22 ° This risk is
nothing new.22 ' Successive carriage to and from the United
States by a carrier who is not governed by the Montreal Agree-
ment already bears this risk.222 This criticism of the Japanese
Initiative should be given minimal weight.
With all the discussion about the Japanese Initiative, and with
pressure on air carriers to "adopt the Japanese solution," many
airlines are busy obtaining insurance quotations.22 3 Can the in-
surance industry absorb and provide coverage for unlimited lia-
bility for air carriers? Currently, combined single-limit policies
of up to U.S. $1.5 billion have been underwritten without diffi-
culty.2 24 It is estimated that a U.S. $1 billion policy should ade-
quately cover unlimited liability damages in even the worst crash
scenario. 2
25
It is difficult to estimate exactly how much insurance premi-
ums will increase because of unlimited liability.226 But for major
airlines with exposure to high-value societies, it is probable that
the increase in death or injury liability premiums would be no
216 Martin & French, supra note 173, at 44.
217 Id.












greater than five to seven percent.2 27 Cost will not be prohibi-
tive for most air carriers since insurance costs are less than one
percent of operating costs. 22 8 Since the underwriting market
seems to be prepared to share the risk of unlimited liability in
order to decrease the costs of litigation, air carriers should seri-
ously consider contracting out of the Warsaw Convention and
providing unlimited liability for their passengers.2 29
V. CONCLUSION
The Warsaw Convention has not achieved its original goal of
providing industry-wide uniform liability for death or personal
injury caused by airline accidents. Several amendments to the
Warsaw Convention have increased the liability limits from a low
of U.S. $8300 to a high of U.S. $75,000.230 Even with increases
in the Warsaw Convention liability limits, there is still concern
that the limits have not kept up with the rising costs of inflation
and therefore do not adequately compensate the victims of an
air accident.231 Moreover, the U.S. $75,000 liability limit applies
only to air carriers that have signed the Montreal Agreement,
and then only to international flights that include the United
States as the point of origin, point of destination, or an agreed-
upon stopping point..23
Even with the failure of the U.S. air carriers to increase liabil-
ity limits, commentators predict that the trend toward increas-
ing liability limits will continue. 33 It is also predicted that the
Japanese unlimited liability plan will contribute to confusion
among airline passengers. 234 Code-shared flights and successive
carriage flights with through-ticketing may contribute to-passen-
ger expectations that the liability limits of the carrier issuing the
ticket will extend throughout the trip regardless of destina-
tion. 35 Ross Marland, legal officer for British Aviation Insur-
ance Group, predicts that "courts are likely to assume that no-
limit cover extends through all sectors. ' '23 6 Second, carriers will
227 Id. High-value societies include the United States, Japan, and Europe. Id.
228 Id. Of the one percent cost for insurance, only one-half of that is for per-
sonal liability insurance. Id.
229 Rice, Business and the Law, supra note 74, at 16.
230 See Shapiro, supra note 61, at 3.
231 Leich, supra note 64, at 414.
232 Montreal Protocol, supra note 16, at 7302.
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inevitably be "saddled with unlimited liability.., because of the
legal difficulties of arguing otherwise. "27 This possibility raises
the expectation that many airlines will opt for unlimited
liability.23 8
The Japanese Initiative seems to be the solution to the recov-
ery problems associated with the Warsaw Convention. Since one
of the main criticisms of the Warsaw Convention is that its liabil-
ity limits do not keep up with the rising costs of inflation, the no-
liability option of the Japanese Initiative seems to be the perfect
solution to the criticism. Since the insurance industry appears
to be prepared to absorb the increased cost of an unlimited lia-
bility system for air carriers, why, then, have no air carriers fol-
lowed the lead that the Japanese airlines have started?
Many of the world's air carriers are waiting to see what the
United States will do before they take their own action. As a
result, the Japanese Initiative has stalled. Despite the fact that
no air carrier has followed the Japanese Initiative, it still remains
a viable alternative to the strict liability limits of the Warsaw Con-
vention. Since Warsaw Convention liability limits have not kept
up with the rising cost of inflation and do not serve fully to com-
pensate the victims of an air carrier crash, the fault-based, no-
limit liability of the Japanese Initiative is an attractive solution to
the problem of how much a victim of an air carrier crash should
be compensated.
237 Id.
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